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ABSTRACT
This paper considers watermarking detection, also known as zero-bit watermarking. A watermark, carrying
no hidden message, is inserted in content. The watermark detector checks for the presence of this particular
weak signal in content. The paper aims at looking to this problem from a classical detection theory point of
view, but with side information enabled at the embedding side. This means that the watermarking signal is a
function of the host content. Our study is twofold. The first issue is to design the best embedding function for
a given detection function (a Neyman-Pearson detector structure is assumed). The second issue is to find the
best detection function for a given embedding function. This yields two conditions, which are mixed into one
‘fundamental’ differential equation. Solutions to this equation are optimal in these two senses. Interestingly, there
are other solutions than the regular quantization index modulation scheme. The JANIS scheme, for instance,
invented in a heuristic manner several years ago, is justified as it is one of these solutions.
1. INTRODUCTION
In the past five years, side-informed embedding strategies have been shown to greatly improve watermark de-
coding. They exploit knowledge of the host signal during the construction of the watermark signal. The theory
underlying these side-informed schemes was presented in the famous paper “Writing on Dirty paper” by M. Costa
in 1983. Our work gives some theoretical aspect of the achievable performances when using side-information at
the embedding side, as in Costa’s correspondence, but for the watermark detection (aka zero-bit watermarking)
problem. This surprisingly received almost no study compared to the issue of watermark decoding, although
it is perceived as a non trivial problem.1 Some exceptions are works from M. Miller et al (embedding cone),2
JANIS3 and watermark detection with QIM schemes.4
1.1. Motivations from the application side
The trade-off between payload of the hidden message and robustness is a well known fact in watermarking.
The main rationale for zero-bit watermarking, as defined in Sect. 2.2.3 of I.Cox et al book,5 is that maximum
robustness is targeted as the payload is reduced to the minimum. Here are two application scenarios where
zero-bit watermarking might be sufficient, i.e. it is not necessary to hide a message, but just a presence of a
mark.
Some copy protection platforms6 use watermark as a flag whose presence warns compliant devices that the
piece of content they are dealing with, is a copyrighted material. Content access and copy protection are tackled
by cryptographic primitives. Watermarking just prevents the ‘analog hole’.7–9 In other words, compliant devices
expect three kinds of content: commercial content which are encrypted and watermarked, free content which
are in the clear and not watermarked, and pirated content through the ‘analog hole’ which are in the clear but
watermarked. Although some DRM systems hide a message as the copy status, we have seen here that the
presence of a mark is indeed sufficient.
Copyright protection is the most famous application of watermarking. However, hiding the name of the
author in his work is not a legal proof. In Europe, the only legal way is the following: first, the author must be
a member of an author society, then he registers his work. The only legal proof is to bring evidence that the
suspicious image is indeed a version of a work belonging to the author society’s database. Consequently, this is a
yes/no question, which can be solved by detecting the presence or absence of a watermark previously embedded
by this author society.
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In these two scenarios, we believe that the presence of a watermark is not a secret. The attacker wanting
to remove this mark, obviously knows which content is watermarked. In the copy protection application, for
instance, there is no point in attacking a personal video which is a ‘free copy’ content, not protected neither by
encryption nor by watermarking.
1.2. Motivations from the scientific side
Zero-bit watermarking is closely related to detection of weak signals in noisy environment: the watermark signal
is embedded in a host signal, unknown to the detector. Its power is very weak compared the one of the host.
Watermarkers resorted to elements of detection theory (or binary hypothesis testing) very early. This includes the
use of Neyman-Pearson and Pitman-Noether theorems, calculus of efficacy, LMP tests (Locally Most Powerful),10
and robust statistics.11
The priority was at these times to design a better detector than the classical correlation, which is only
optimal for white gaussian host signals. To name a few, this includes the works of teams such as Q. Cheng
and T. Huang,12 A. Briassouli and M. Strinzis,13 M. Barni et al.14 They assumed that the host signals
follow a known pdf (probability density function), and they applied classical elements of detection theory above-
mentioned. X. Huang and B. Zhang relaxed this implicit assumption and set that the ‘real’ pdf of the host
belongs to a given family of functions.15 The test should be designed to fairly perform for the entire family.
This allows to encompass attacks modifying this pdf into this family.
Another track is to see the host signal as a side information only available at the embedding. Side information
brings huge improvements in watermark decoding. However, its use for zero-bit watermarking has received less
interest. Pioneer works are mostly heuristic approaches.2, 16 More recent works use the binning principle to
achieve zero-bit watermarking,4, 17 although J. Eggers noticed that SCS is less efficient for zero-bit than positive
rate watermarking scheme (See Sect. 3.6 of his book18). Indeed, Erez et al. proved the optimality of Lattice
QIM for strictly positive rate data hiding as far as an additive white gaussian noise attack is considered.19 In
the case of zero-rate watermarking, P. Moulin et al. reasonably conjecture that sparse Lattice QIM is optimal.20
For zero-bit watermarking, Lattice QIM achieves high performances showing some host interference rejection.4
However, there is a loss of efficacy compared to the private setup where the side information is also available at
the detector.
1.3. Strategy of this paper
N. Merhav mentioned during the WaCha’05 workshop in Barcelona, that zero-bit watermarking is a hard problem
whose optimal solution is not known for the moment.1 Especially, up to now, there is no reason why the binning
principle should be optimal, even if it has the best performances against an AWGN attack. Moreover, QIM
schemes are known to be weak against scale gain attack.
We would like to follow a different track, closer to the theory of weak signal detection but taking into account
the side information at the embedding. Our goal is not to work on an accurate statistical model of the host
signal as done in prior wroks. On contrary, we will use very basic assumptions (gaussian distribution or flat-host
assumption) in order to stress how side information increases performances.
2. BOUNDS
The ambition of this section is extremely small. It is only a pastiche of M. Costa’s article but formulated in
detection theoretical terms rather than with mutual information, capacity, and so on. Our motivation is to
illustrate that decoding one bit is strongly different from detecting whether a content has been watermarked or
not, although many authors in watermarking literature have been confusing these two topics.
2.1. Mathematical model
We wish to detect the presence of a watermark signal in a digital content. As depicted in Fig. 1, the embedder
transforms an original host signal S into a watermarked content f(S) = S+X. The host signal or channel state
S in composed of some components of the original content and is assumed to be a sequence of n independent
identically distributed (i.i.d.) N (0, Q) random variables. The watermark signal must not bring any annoying
perceptual artefacts so that, in our simple model, f must satisfy the following power constraint:
1
n
E{‖f(S)− S‖2} ≤ P, (1)
where E is the mathematical expectation. In real application, the power P of the watermark signal is indeed
very weak compared to Q for invisibility reason.
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Figure 1. Framework for watermark detection
The channel output is given by R1 = ρ(S+X+Z), where the channel noise Z which represents the impact of
an attack, is assumed to be distributed according to N (0, NIn) (In is the n× n identity matrix). Scaling factor
ρ =
√
Q/(Q+N) renders the power of R1 (we approximate P +Q ∼ Q) equal to the power of S while keeping
a watermark to noise ratio P/N .
Upon receipt of R the detector makes a binary decision D: d = 1 (d = 0) means that, according to
the detector, the analysed piece of content is watermarked (resp. it has not been watermarked). There are
two hypotheses: Under hypothesis H0, the detector receives an original content R = R0 = S (see end of
subsection 1.1 for justifications), whereas under hypothesis H1, the detector receives a watermarked but attacked
content R = R1. Probability of false alarm Pfa and power of the test Pp are given by
Pfa = Pr{D = 1|H0} ; Pp = Pr{D = 1|H1}. (2)
This is the standard watermark Gaussian model with power constraint P , where the embedder is informed
of part of Gaussian additive noise sequence that will be added to his watermark signal. Unfortunately, in blind
schemes, this information is not made available to the detector, who will have to base its decision D solely on
received vector R.
At first glance, it would seem that the problem of watermark detection is simpler than the decoding of
hidden symbols, because the detection’s output belongs to a message space which is bigger than the actual
range B = {0, 1}. In other words, whereas the watermark detection implies a simple binary hypotheses test, the
decoding of watermark is a complex multiple hypotheses test.
Yet, no theoretical limit has been shown for watermark detection. In the decoding problem, M. Costa21
first pointed out that the capacity C? of a channel with side-information at the encoder is obviously in between
C(P/(Q + N)), capacity of a channel without side information, and C(P/N), capacity of a channel with side
information at the encoder and decoder side, where C(x) = 12 ln (1 + x). Then, inventing an embedding scheme
and thanks to the Gel’fand and Pinsker’s formula, he has shown that the upper bound is achievable: C? =
C(P/N). The main insight is that the optimal capacity doesn’t depend on the power of the original vector and
it is equal to the capacity when the decoder is not blind.
In watermarking detection, no symbol is transmitted. Our problem is then fundamentally different from the
communication of one bit because, under hypothesis H0, no processing is applied and S is directly sent to the
detector. The channel capacity is not relevant in this context. Our goal is to distinguish which of two probability
density functions, pR0 or pR1 , received vector R is drawn from. Whereas pR0 = pS is imposed by the nature of
the extracted components of the original content, function f turns it into a substentially different pdf pR1 . The
discrimination between the two pdf plays the role of the channel capacity as it is useful for forming bounds on
the detection performances. Thanks to the data processing theorem,22 we have:
L(R0;R1) ≥ L(D0;D1). (3)
The discrimination L(R0;R1) between pdfs pR0 and pR1 upper bounds discrimination L(D0;D1) between
P (D|H0) = (1 − Pfa, Pfa) and P (D|H1) = (1 − Pp, Pp). For instance, suppose we have pS ∼ N (0, QIn)
and pR1 ∼ N (a, QIn):
L(R0;R1) =
∫
Rn
pR0(r) ln
pR0(r)
pR1(r)
dr =
1
2Q
ER0{‖r− a‖2 − ‖r‖2} =
‖a‖2
2Q
, (4)
and
L(D0;D1) = (1− Pfa) ln
1− Pfa
1− Pp
+ Pfa ln
Pfa
Pp
. (5)
L(R0;R1) is constraining the receiver operating point (Pfa, Pp). A high discrimination is a necessary condition
to have good detection performances. Finally, the watermark detection problem is equivalent to finding the
embedding function f that maximises L(R0;R1) under the power constraint P and the fact that an attack
occurs on the way to the receiver. In the sequel, we give the bounds of L(R0;R1).
2.2. Bounds
Contrary to the channel capacity, L(R0;R1) is not a measure representing the nature of a channel, as it also
depends on the chosen function f . For instance, the identity is a possible choice which leads to the equality
pR1 = pS (thanks to scaling factor ρ and the Gaussianity assumption), whence L(R0;R1) = 0. Denote FP the
set of functions fulfilling the power constraint (1). We define L(R0;R1) as:
L(R0;R1) = max
f∈FP
L(R0;R1). (6)
Copying the rationale from M. Costa, it is obvious that a lower bound of L(R0;R1) is K(P/(Q+N)), where
K(x) = nx/2. This corresponds to the situation without any side information. Function f produces a signal X
independent of S and with the maximum energy allowed
∑n
i=1X
2
i = nP . Consequently, pR1 ∼ N (ρX, QIn) and
Eq. (4) yields the result.
The upper bound is a little more complicated to find out. If we apply the rationale of M. Costa, this latter
is given assuming the embedder and the detector both know channel state S. As the expected discrimination is
nondecreasing under conditioning,22 we have∗: L(R0;R1) ≤ L(R0;R1|S). A perfect detector is then possible.
It outputs d = 1 if R 6= S, d = 0 if R = S. We are sure that L(R0;R1) = +∞ as (Pfa, Pp) = (0, 1) implies
L(D0;D1) = +∞. Moreover, it is still true when P → 0+. In conclusion, whereas this rationale led to a useful
bound in watermark decoding, we don’t learn anything in watermarking detection.
To discover a closer upper bound, we change our framework to an equivalent problem depicted in Fig. 2. The
attack is reproduced even on original content, i.e. under hypothesis H0, R0 = ρ(S + Z). This has absolutely no
∗The expected discrimination is defined on expectation across the randomness of S, and not for a specific S = s:
L(R0;R1|S) =
R
L(R0;R1|S = s)pS(s)ds.
signification in real life. An attacker has no interest in pirating an original content which contains no watermark
signal, as discussed in subsection 1.1. Yet, from an information theory point of view, the two frameworks are
equivalent as pR0 is still distributed as N (0, QIn). The detector is doing the same task in both frameworks. The
function f which maximises L(R0;R1) in the second case produces the same distance in our first framework,
and vice versa. Hence, both frameworks share the same maximum discrimination L(R0;R1).
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Figure 2. Equivalent framework
Let us now apply Costa’s rationale on the second framework: the upper bound is given when the channel
state is available at the detection side. The detector has to make a distinction between R1 = ρ(X + S + Z) and
R0 = ρ(S + Z) knowing the channel state S. Hence R0 is distributed as N (ρS, ρ2NI), whereas the pdf of R1 is
N (ρ(S + X), ρ2NI). This produces the following discrimination:
L(R0;R1|S) =
nP
2N
= K(P/N). (7)
The conclusion of this short study is the following inequality:
K
(
P
N +Q
)
≤ L(R0;R1) ≤ K
(
P
N
)
. (8)
2.3. Comparison to the upper bound
This section compares the discrimination induced by embedding functions from classical zero-bit watermarking
schemes to the upper bound. For this matter, we compute the ratio κ = L(R0;R1)/K(P/N).
Before, we analyse the special case N = 0 where the upper bound goes to +∞. Let f be a quantizer q
inducing a distortion energy lower than nP . It means that X is indeed the quantization error q(S) − S. This
process transforms the pdf pS into a probability mass function PR1 . R0 is a continuous random vector, whereas
R1 is a discrete random variable belonging to the set Q of codewords. A perfect test with (Pfa, Pp) = (0, 1) is
possible. It outputs d = 1 if r ∈ Q, d = 0 else. As the probability that the continuous random variable S exactly
equals a codeword is null, then Pfa = 0. L(D0;D1) = +∞ and consequently L(R0;R1) = +∞.
ISS is a watermarking scheme proposed by H. Malvar and D. Florêncio.23 The embedding function is defined
as:
f(S) = S + (α− λStU)U. (9)
where U is a vector with unity norm known at the embedding and the detection sides, α ∈ R+ and λ ∈ [0, 1]
are two parameters such that nP = α2 + λ2Q to fulfil power constraint (1). If λ = 0, f is indeed the very well
known direct sequence spread spectrum watermarking technique. If λ = 1, f corresponds to the fixed normalized
correlation embedding strategy explained in I.Cox et al book.5 M. Costa named it the ‘fight and cancel’ strategy
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Figure 3. a) Graph of κ(P/N) for n = 1024, Q = 1, P/Q = −26dB. Dashed line: λ = 0, this corresponds to DSSS but
also to the lower bound κDSSS(P/N) = K(P/(Q + N))/K(P/N). Dotted line: λ = 1, this corresponds to the ‘erase and
set’ strategy. Plain line: λ = λ?, this is κISS(P/N). b) Power of polynomial and sinusoidal schemes.
where part of the watermark power is used to cancel the impact of the channel state. This is only possible with
ISS if nP ≥ Q. After some calculus, we get:
κISS(λ) =
N
nP
(
nP − λ2Q+Q/ρ2
(1− λ)2Q+N
− 1 + ln ρ
2((1− λ)2Q+N)
Q
)
, (10)
which is maximal for λ = λ?, solution of the following equation:
π(λ) = −λ3 + 2λ2 + nP +N −Q
Q
λ− nP
Q
= 0. (11)
Note that we are sure to find λ? ∈ [0, 1] as π is a continuous function and π(0) = −nP/Q and π(1) = N/Q.
Asymptotically, when n→ +∞, λ? → 1 and
lim
n→+∞
κISS(λ?) = 1. (12)
Hence, asymptotically, L(R0;R1) equals K(P/N). ISS achieves the upper bound for long sequences. Note that,
for a finite n such that nP ≥ Q, it is also the case when N → 0. Figure 3 plots ratio κ against the watermark to
noise power ratio in dB. We have chosen n = 1024, Q = 1 and P/Q = −26dB. The ISS embedder is linear, thus,
according to Eq. (18) of N. Merhav paper,1 it is not the optimal embedder. However, our purpose is absolutely
not to propose the optimal (once again, this is a hard problem1), but to illustrate with a well known scheme (but
only asymptotically) that L(R0;R1) = K
(
P
N
)
. It has been shown that the discrimination of a watermarking
detection framework with additive Gaussian noise followed by Wiener filtering and power constrained embedding
is not affected by the cover signal as long as knowledge of this sequence is given to the embedder.
It is quite important to outline the limitation of this section. Our rationale only works with one type of
attack (addition of white gaussian noise and Wiener filtering) and one type of pdf, i.e. white gaussian noise.
The upper bound is extremely important from a theoretical point of view, but practical limitations may spoil a
high L(R0;R1). The Neyman-Pearson theorem states that the detector first calculates a statistic T ∈ R whose
thresholding yields binary decision D ∈ B. Sufficient statistic T (R) = ln p(R|H1)/p(R|H0) insures that there is
no loss of information, i.e. L(T0;T1) = L(R0;R1). Yet, it may be impossible to calculate this sufficient statistic.
For instance, the exact pdf pS, the embedding power P and the attack really undergone might depend from a
content to another. In real life application, watermarking detectors are only Locally Most Powerful tests.
2.4. Digression
T. Liu and P. Moulin worked on a third framework where R0 = S + Z and R1 = X + S + Z. There is no
scaling factor ρ. With the Gaussianity assumption, it happens that this framework has same discrimination
bound: K(P/N). It means, that theoretically, this third framework poses a problem as difficult as the first and
second ones. However, these authors proposed a practical solution based on the binning strategy, which may not
be efficient for the first two frameworks. The scaling factor, unknown at the detection side (and also N), as a
collapsing effect on the performances at low watermark to noise power ratio.
3. DETECTION OF WEAK SIGNAL DEPENDENT ON SIDE INFORMATION
This section gives expression for best detectors and best embedding functions, when no attack is lead. From the
above section, we know that a quantizer embedding function is optimal. Yet, its performances will collapse with
the SAWGN attack. This is the reason why we look for a embedding function as f(s, θ) = s + θx(s) where x(.)
is a smooth function from Rn to Rn, with the constraint that E(‖x(s)‖2) = n. Therefore, θ =
√
P .
3.1. Best detectors for a given embedding function
We assume that the detector has the structure of a Neyman-Pearson test. First, it applies a function t(r) mapping
from Rn to R. Then, this scalar is compared to a threshold τ : d = (t(r) > τ).
The issue is whether the problem is a simple hypothesis test (θ is fixed) or composite one sided hypothesis
test (θ > 0). Although we presented it as simple hypothesis test in the previous theoretical section, in practice,
pieces of content might bear different watermarking power. Even within a content, the embedding gain might
depend on a perceptual adaptation. In this case, θ should be considered as the average embedding gain. In the
sequel, we will adapt the value of θ to s. Finally, the watermark signal is weak. For all these reasons, a classical
element of detection theory states that the optimal detection function is the Local Most Powerful test in θ ∼ 0:
t(r) = kt
1
p(r|H0)
∂p(r|H1)
∂θ
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
, (13)
with p(r|H0) = pS(r) and p(r|H1) = pR(r). The role of kt is explained below.
We assume function f(s, θ) is invertible: s = f−1(r, θ). This allows to write pR(r) = pS(f−1(r, θ))|Jf−1(r, θ)|,
with the last term being the Jacobian of f−1 taken at (r, θ). Developing this last equation, we finally get this
expression:
t(r) = −kt
div(pS(r)x(r))
pS(r)
= −kt
∇pS(r)T
pS(r)
x(r)− ktdiv(x(r)). (14)
The first term corresponds to the regular LMP test, whereas the second term is not null whenever side information
is enabled at the embedding side.
According to the Pitman-Noether theorem, a good way to compare tests is to calculate their efficacy R,
defined in our case by:
R =
[
∂ψ(θ)
∂θ
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
]2
.
1
σt|H0
2
, with ψ(θ) = µt|H1(θ)− µt|H0 and σt|H0
2 = Var(t|H0). (15)
With no loss of generality, we assume that t(.) is such that µt|H0 = 0 and σt|H0 = 1 (otherwise, it is easy to work
with (t(.)− µt|H0)/σt|H0). For this reason, the multiplicative constant kt is introduced in (13).
Mixing (13) and (15), it appears that:
R = k−2t =
∫ (
∂pR(r)
∂θ
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
)2
pS(r)−1dr (16)
3.2. Best embedding function for a given detection function
The detection function being given, the only way to increase R is to work on µt|H1(θ):
∂ψ(θ)
∂θ
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
=
∂
∂θ
E(t(r)|H1)
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
(17)
= E
(
∂
∂θ
t(s + θx(s))
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
)
= E(x(s)T∇t(s)). (18)
It appears that, for a given t(.), the embedding strategy maximizing R is to have :
x(s) = kx∇t(s) ∀s ∈ Rn. (19)
where kx is a normalizing constant to achieve E(‖x(s)‖2) = n, equalling kx =
√
n/E(‖∇t(s)‖2). The efficacy is
then equal to:
R = n2k−2x = nE(‖∇t(s)‖2). (20)
3.3. Synthesis
We know how to design the best embedding function for a given detection function, and how to design the best
detection function for a given embedding function. This remembers the Lloyd-Max algorithm in quantization.
However, we can insert (19) in (14) yielding a differential equation, that we loosely name ‘fundamental equation
of zero-bit watermarking’:
pS(r)t(r) + ktkx.div(pS(r)∇t(r)) = 0 ∀r ∈ Rn. (21)
Hence, the best couple of detection/embedding functions {t(.),x(.)} is {t?(.), kx∇t?(.)}, with t?(.) solution of
(21). Note that Eq. (16) and (20) are still valid. Therefore, it is possible to build a scheme of a given R (as high
as possible), provided (21) admits a solution with kxkt = nR−1.
This equation can also be written as:
R
n
t(r) +
∇pS(r)T
pS(r)
∇t(r) +∇2t(r) = 0,
∇2t(r) being the Laplacian of t(r).
4. SOME SOLUTIONS OF THE FUNDAMENTAL EQUATION OF ZERO-BIT
WATERMARKING
We are not able to provide a general expression of the class of solutions. However, in some cases, we show some
examples of solutions.
4.1. The scalar case
We suppose here that the host samples are i.i.d. such that pS(s) =
∏n
i=1 pS(si). Moreover, our strategy is to
maintain this statistical independence while embedding the watermark: x(s) = (ε1x(s1), . . . , εnx(sn))T , where
ε is a secret vector, with for instance, εi = ±1∀i ∈ {0, . . . , n}. (14) shows that t(r) =
∑n
i=1 εit(ri). Denote
R = nR̄. Finally, (21) boils down to a scalar second-order ordinary differential equation with non constant
coefficient:
R̄t(r) +
p′S(r)
pS(r)
t′(r) + t′′(r) = 0. (22)
4.1.1. Gaussian case
We assume that s ∼ N (0, 1). (21) becomes even simpler: R̄t(r) − rt′(r) + t′′(r) = 0. Yet, the solution is not
trivial. It is a linear combination of two ‘independent’ (their Wronskian is not null) confluent hypergeometric
functions of the first kind taken in r2/2:
t1(r) = a1 1F1
(
− R̄
2
,
1
2
,
r2
2
)
+ b1, (23)
t2(r) = a2r 1F1
(
1− R̄
2
,
3
2
,
r2
2
)
+ b2. (24)
Constants (ai, bi) must be chosen such that (µt|H0 , σt|H0) = (0, 1). If R̄ is an even integer, t1(.) is a polynomial
function. If R̄ is a odd integer, t2(.) is a polynomial function. Table 1 gives the expressions of these polynomial
solutions and their associated embedding function. The first line of this Table is the well known direct spread
R̄ x(s) t(r) σ
2
1−σ
2
0
σ20
1 1 r 0
2 s −1+r
2
√
2
6θ2
3 −1+s
2
√
2
−3r+r3√
6
66θ2
4 −3s+s
3
√
6
3−6r2+r4
2
√
6
608θ2
5 3−6s
2+s4
2
√
6
15r−10r3+r5
2
√
30
5470θ2
6 15s−10s
3+s5
2
√
30
−15+45r2−15r4+r6
12
√
5
49122θ2
7 −15+45s
2−15s4+s6
12
√
5
−105r+105r3−21r5+r7
12
√
35
441392θ2
Table 1. Polynomial solutions of the scalar Gaussian case.
spectrum scheme with a linear correlator, optimal detector in the Gaussian i.i.d. case. The second line is known
as the proportional embedding.
4.1.2. Uniform case
We were surprised to find solutions which were very different from the binning principle. The classical ‘flat-host’
assumption used in QIM scheme states that the host pdf is a piecewise constant function. In this case, (21)
defined almost everywhere, is a lot simpler: R̄t(r) + t′′(r) = 0, whose obvious solutions is t1(r) = a1 cos(R̄r),
t2(r) = a2 sin(
√
R̄r), and hence, w1(s) = −
√
2 sin(
√
R̄s), w2(s) =
√
2 cos(
√
R̄s).
Although these are not exactly the embedding function of the scalar QIM (aka SCS), they look like it at least
for their periodic character.
4.2. The vector case
We assume here that S ∼ N (0, In). Then, ∇pS(r) = −pS(r)r, and (21) becomes R̄t(r)− rT∇t(r) +∇2t(r) = 0.
4.2.1. JANIS is a solution for the Gaussian case
We are not able to find a general solution. However JANIS, a zero-bit watermarking scheme invented heuristically
some years ago,3, 16 is a solution. The detection function is the following one:
t(r) =
√
p
n
n/p∑
i=1
p∏
j=1
rji .
Indices ji are such that rk appears only once in the detection function, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. It is easy to see that
rT∇t(r) = pt(r) and ∇2t(r) = 0. Thus, JANIS with order p is a solution to (21) with R̄ = p. This theoretical
framework proves the optimality of the JANIS scheme.
4.3. Uniform case
(21) reduces to the well known Helmholtz equation: R̄t(r) +∇2t(r) = 0, which is usually solved by separation
of variables method.
4.4. Additional comments
4.4.1. About the Pitman Noether theorem
As seen in the subsection 3.2, we are able to build schemes whose efficacy R is controlled. It means that,
asymptotically, hypothesis H1 gives a random variable t(R) which is distributed as N (
√
Rθ, 1 + o(θ)) (if θ were
fixed), whereas, under H0, t(R) ∼ N (0, 1). These tests are sometimes called symmetric as both hypothesis yield
Gaussian distribution with the same variance, at least to the first order. However, as shown in Table 1, the
difference between the two variances gets bigger as R̄ increases. For this reason, high efficacy schemes work only
for small embedding power P or embedding gain θ: the amplification of the efficacy R is spoiled by a big variance
σt|H1
2.
4.4.2. Asymmetric tests
Let us focus more on the variance σt|H1
2. As H. Malvar and D. Florencio did for zero-rate watermarking,23 we
would like to control the value of σt|H1
2, achieving so-called asymmetric tests.
For this purpose, we adapt the gain factor θ to s, such that E{θ(s)2‖x(s)‖2} = nP . Moreover, we still
maintain E{‖x(s)‖2} = n and the embedding strategy. The idea is that the amplitude of the watermark signal
is a very small value so that a Taylor expansion is reasonable around θ(s) = 0.
σt|H1
2 = E{(t(S + θ(S)X(S))− µt|H1)
2}
= E{(t(S) + θ(S)∇t(S)T X(S)− µt|H1 + o(|θ(s)|))
2}
= E{(t(S) + kθ(S)‖∇t(S)‖2 − kE{θ(S)‖∇t(S)‖2})2}+ o(nP ). (25)
Define ν(S) = kθ(S)‖∇t(S)‖2, and ν̃(S) = ν(S)− Eν(S). We then get:
σt|H1
2 = 1 + Var(ν̃(S)) + 2E{t(S)ν̃(S)}.
In order to decrease σt|H1 in the most efficient way, we impose ν̃(S) = −c.t(S), with constant 1 ≥ c ≥ 0:
σt|H1
2 = 1 + Var(ct(S))− 2cE{t(S)2} = (1− c)2. (26)
Hence, we achieve to reduce σt|H1 . However, this strategy consumes embedding distortion:
nP = E{ν(S)2/‖∇t(S)‖2} = E{(µt|H1 − c.t(S))
2/‖∇t(S)‖2}
= µt|H1
2E{‖∇t(S)‖−2}+ c2E{t(S)2‖∇t(S)‖−2} − 2cµt|H1E{t(S)‖∇t(S)‖
−2}. (27)
For the simple cases explored in this paper, we have a symmetry in t(.) and pS(.), that imposes a third null
term E{t(S)‖∇t(S)‖−2} = 0. Denote a = E{‖∇t(S)‖−2} and b = E{t(S)2‖∇t(S)‖−2}. Finally, asymptotically
and if P is small or with a power Pn = P/n (see the conditions of Pitman Noether theorem), the receiver
operating curve tends to Pp = 1− Φ(ζ(c)), with
ζ(c) =
Φ−1(1− Pfa)−
√
(nPn − bc2)/a
|1− c|
. (28)
Basically, a higher c decreases σt|H1 = |1−c| but also µt|H1 =
√
(nPn − bc2)/a due to the distortion constraint
(27). We have to find the best c such that ζ(c) is minimized.
5. ATTACK NOISE
The attack produces R1 = ρ(S + X(S) + Z) with Z ∼ N (0, NIn). The strength of the attack, represented by
power N , is not known at the detection side. We express the efficacy as a function of ρ. We now have :
ψ(θ) =
∫ ∫
t(ρ(s + θx(s) + z))pS(s)pZ(z)dsdz (29)
∂ψ(θ)
∂θ
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
=
∫
ρx(s)T
(∫
∇t(ρ(s + z))pZ(z)dz
)
pS(s)ds, (30)
such that finally R(ρ) = ρ2R(1)ES{x(s)T EZ{x(ρ(s + z))}}2.
5.1. polynomial solutions
Assume first that ρ = 1 (no scaling). Then, the efficacy is not modified, however, the variance σt|H1
2 increases.
We have:
µt|H1 =
√
R(1)θ +O(θ2) σt|H1
2 = σt|H0
2 +R(1)N +O(N2) (31)
Assuming ρ =
√
Q/(Q+N) (scaling), the efficacy is clearly modified: R(ρ) = R(1)ρ2R̄. However, the
situation is better described by the following data:
µt|H1 =
√
R(ρ)θ +O(θ2) σt|H1
2 = 1 +O(θ2) (32)
5.2. sinusoidal solutions
Even knowing that the host is gaussian distributed, we select a scalar solution optimal in the uniform case. In
other words, we assume the flat-host assumption. In this case,
(x(s), t(r)) =
(
e
ω2
2√
cosh(ω2)
cos(ωs),
e
ω2
2√
sinh(ω2)
sin(ωr)
)
.
This yields an efficacy R(1) = nω2 coth(ω2) when no attack is performed.
When no scaling is performed during the attack, we have the following mean and variance:
µt|H1 =
√
R(1)θe−
ω2N
2 σt|H1
2 = e−ω
2N sinh(ω
2(1 +N))
sinh(ω)
. (33)
In case of noise addition plus scaling attack, we have R(ρ) = R(1)ρ2 cosh(ω
2ρ)2
cosh(ω2)2 . However, the situation is
better described by the following data:
µt|H1 =
√
R(ρ)θ +O(θ2) σt|H1
2 = 1 +O(θ2). (34)
5.3. comparison
Host vectors are white Gaussian noise with length n = 2048. The probability of false alarm is set to Pfa = 10−4
giving a threshold τ = 3, 719. The embedding distortion is fixed to −26dB, θ = 0.05. Fig.(??) shows the power of
the polynomial and sinusoidal tests for the AWGN and SAWGN attacks. These schemes have the same efficacy
(R̄ = 4) when no attack is lead. Polynomial solutions are far more robust in the non-scaling attack, and they
perform slightly better in the scaling scenario.
6. CONCLUSION
Our future work is to build better schemes with the idea of mixing different detector functions. We will also look
for the worst case attack. This implies that there is a game between the attacker and the embedder. Another
interesting point will be to adapt the ‘Robust statistics’11 theory to side information embedding.
REFERENCES
1. N. Merhav, “An information-theoretic view of watermarking embedding-detection and geometric attacks.”
presented at WaCha05, available at www.ee.technion.ac.il/people/merhav/, jun 2005.
2. M. Miller, I. Cox, and J. Bloom, “Informed embedding: exploiting image and detector information during
watermark insertion,” in Proc. of Int. Conf. on Image Processing, IEEE, (Vancouver, Canada), September
2000.
3. J. Delhumeau, T. Furon, N. Hurley, and G. Silvestre, “Improved polynomial detectors for side-informed
watermarking,” in Security and Watermarking of Multimedia Contents IV, pp. 311–321, SPIE Electronic
Imaging, (Santa Clara, Cal., USA), January 2003.
4. T. Liu and P. Moulin, “Error exponents for one-bit watermarking,” in Proc. of ICASSP, (Hong-Kong), apr
2003.
5. I. Cox, M. Miller, and J. Bloom, Digital Watermarking, Morgan Kaufmann Publisher, 2001.
6. J. Andreaux, A. Durand, T. Furon, and E. Diehl, “Copy protection system for digital home networks,” IEEE
Signal Processing Magazine 21, pp. 100–108, March 2004. Special Issue on Digital Right Management.
7. 2004.
8. E. Diehl and T. Furon, “Closing the analog hole,” in Proc. of Int. Consumer Electronics, IEEE, ed., pp. 52–
53, 2003.
9. E. Lin, A. Eskiciog̀lu, R. Lagendijk, and E. Delp, “Advances in digital video content protection,” Proc. of
IEEE 93, pp. 171–183, jan 2005.
10. H. V. Poor, An introduction to signal detection and estimation, vol. 2nd edition, Springer, 1994.
11. P. Huber, Robust statistics, J. Wiley and Sons, 1991.
12. Q. Cheng and T. Huang, “Robust optimum detection of transform domain multiplicative watermarks,”
IEEE Trans. Sig. Processing 51, pp. 906–924, apr 2003.
13. A. Briassouli and M. Strinzis, “Locally optimum nonlinearities for DCT watermarking detection,” IEEE
Trans. Image Processing 13, pp. 1604–16017, dec 2004.
14. M. Barni, F. Bartolini, A. de Rosa, and A. Piva, “Optimum decoding and detection of multiplicative
watermarks,” IEEE Trans. Signal Processing 51, pp. 1118–1123, apr 2003.
15. X. Huang and B. Zhang, “Robust detection of transform domain additive watermarks,” in Proc. of Int.
Work. on Digital Watermarking, M. Barni, ed., LNCS 3710, pp. 124–138, Springer, (Siena, Italy), sep
2005.
16. T. Furon, G. Silvestre, and N. Hurley, “JANIS: Just Another N-order side-Informed Scheme,” in Proc. of
Int. Conf. on Image Processing ICIP’02, 2, pp. 153–156, (Rochester, NY, USA), September 2002.
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